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UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS: A FITTING CELEBRATION OF THE
BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. BILL OF RIGHTS
Nadine Strossen*
I. INTRODUCTION
A N eminently appropriate way for the American people to honor the
United States' Bill of Rights, whose bicentennial we celebrated on
December 15, 1991, would be to become party to another, potentially
more protective, set of principles, which carries forward the core human
rights aspirations expressed in the U.S. Bill of Rights: the International
Bill of Rights. The three documents that constitute the International Bill
of Rights are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the
United Nations adopted by consensus in 1948,' and two covenants that
spell out in greater detail the broad principles enunciated in the Universal
Declaration: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") 2 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").3 These three documents contain core human
rights principles that are widely recognized by the international community
The United States has not ratified the ICESCR. Although it did ratify
the ICCPR in 1992, that ratification was limited by such extensive
qualifications as to render it essentially nugatory as a tool for advancing
human rights in the U.S. Indeed, given the breadth of these qualifications,
some international law experts argued that they undermined the very
validity of the U.S. ratification under international law and concluded
that no ratification was a lesser evil than ratification so rife with limitations.
4
Of overriding importance, the U.S. ratification was subject to a
declaration that the ICCPR provisions are not "self-executing," which
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1. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U.L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1982).
2. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
3. Id. at 49.
4. See infra text accompanying note 18.
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means that they are not legally enforceable against federal or state
governments in the U.S. in any American courts; they will be binding in
domestic courts only if Congress passes implementing legislation.5 Moreover,
the U.S. ratification makes exceptions for all ICCPR provisions that set
more protective human rights standards than those currently recogmzed
under U.S. law Therefore, even assuming that the U.S. has satisfied the
international standards for ratification of the ICCPR in a technical sense,
that ratification is not meaningful in terms of extending the human rights
of people in the U.S.
In order to bridge the gap between the exception-ridden ratification of
the U.S. and the human rights standards in the ICCPR, Congress should
pass corrective legislation. For example, the proposed International Human
Rights Conformity Act of 1992, although not correcting every respect in
which U.S. law fails to conform with international human rights standards,
would achieve substantial U.S. compliance with the ICCPR.6
The central point of this article is that meamngful U.S. ratification
7 of
the rights-enhancing provisions of the covenants would be a significant
step in fostering human rights in the U.S. That conclusion follows from
the fact that, in certain important respects, international human rights
norms are more rights-protective than the corresponding domestic law
standards. As the Rehnquist Court continues to construe domestic human
rights norms in an increasingly narrow fashion, the situations in which
international standards afford more protection will increase. Therefore, it
behooves U.S. human rights activists to seek the incorporation of
international human rights norms into domestic law Even if the U.S.
does- not ratify the covenants, U.S. human rights lawyers should urge
U.S. courts to rely on more rights-protective international human rights
standards through the doctrine of unwritten or "customary" international
law To the extent that international standards are less protective of
human rights than their domestic counterparts, the U.S. should not
incorporate them into U.S. law; international human rights precepts should
be invoked only to expand, and not to curtail, Americans' human rights.'
The first part of this article briefly outlines the history of U.S. action
(or inaction) concerning the covenants, as well as the international human
5. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 131
(1987) (U.S. courts are bound to give effect to international law, except that a "non-self-
executing" agreement will be given effect only after adoption of necessary implementing
legislation).
6. See infra text accompanying note 80.
7 Although the U.S. has technically ratified the ICCPR, for the reasons noted above,
that ratification was lacking in real significance, in terms of making the ICCPR's rights-
enhancing provisions domestically enforceable. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, through-
out this article, the term "meaningful ratification" will be used to signify a ratification
that is not crippled with nghts-undermining qualifications. Such a ratification could be
secured, in effect, through corrective legislation such as the International Human Rights
Conformity Act of 1992.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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rights and foreign policy concerns weighing in favor of meaningful U.S.
ratification. The second part then canvasses the advantages of ratification
specifically in terms of domestic civil rights and liberties. It outlines the
Rehnquist Court's hostility toward individual and minority group rights;
explains how the actual enforcement of such rights throughout our history
has depended on the efforts of domestic human rights organizations, such
as the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"); describes how such
organizations recently have responded to the Rehnquist Court's hostility
to human rights by invoking alternative rights-protective strategies, other
than federal litigation under the U.S. Bill of Rights; and gives examples
of specific areas where reliance on international human rights norms could
constitute one promising alternative strategy
The third part sets out a critical analysis of the reasons for the U.S.'s
historic failure to meaningfully ratify the covenants, emphasizing why
those reasons are unpersuasive. Finally, the fourth part explains how U.S.
lawyers and judges can and should incorporate selected international
human rights norms into U.S. jurisprudence, even absent ratification of
the covenants.
II. HIsToRY OF U.S. NON-RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS
The U.S. was a leader in the forming of the United Nations after World
War II and in drafting the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter.9
The U.S. also has taken a leading role in drafting, and getting other
countries to sign and ratify, approximately forty other international human
rights instruments, including the International Bill of Rights. 10 Both of
the international covenants have been ratified by about one hundred
countries, including virtually every U.S. ally and every Western European
nation, with the sole exceptions of Turkey and Greece." The U.S. voted
for U.N. adoption of the two international covenants in 1966, and signed
those covenants in 1976, but still has not ratified the ICESCR at all, and
did not accomplish even its highly encumbered ratification of the ICCPR
until 1992.
The U.S.'s foot-dragging regarding the international covenants is a
specific manifestation of its general failure to ratify international human
rights treaties. There are more than forty such treaties to which the U.S.
could be a party, of which it has ratified only about a dozen, and most
9. See Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HumAN RioiTrrs 506-09 (1973); Dean Rusk, A Personal Reflection on International Cove-
nants on Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 515, 515 (1981).
10. Judith Guertin, Comment, Customary International Law and Women's Rights:
The Equal Rights Amendment as a Fait Accompli, 1987 DEr. C.L. REv. 121, 133.
11. Statement of the ACLU Before the Foreign Relations Comm. of the U.S. Senate
on Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 13, 1991)
[hereinafter Statement of the ACLU].
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of those are among the least significant.' 2 Among the most important
international human rights treaties to which the U.S. could, but has not,
become a party (aside from the ICESCR) is the major regional agreement
applicable to the Western Hemisphere, the American Convention on
Human Rights. 3
President Carter was the first U.S. President to recommend Senate
ratification of the two covenants. However, he attached many reservations
that would have substantially limited their impact on U.S. human rights
policy ,4 In any event, the Senate did not act favorably on President
Carter's recommendation. Then, throughout its eight-year existence, the
Reagan Administration said that these two covenants were "under review"
and did not take any position for or against ratification."
Until late summer of 1991, the Bush Administration continued in the
Reagan Administration's posture, saying that the lengthy review process
was still ongoing. However, the Bush Administration announced in August
of 1991 that it would be recommending Senate ratification of the ICCPR.'
6
In making this announcement, President Bush said, "U.S. ratification of
the [ICCPR] at this moment in history would underscore our national
commitment to fostering democratic values through international law
U.S. ratification would provide an additional and effective tool in our
efforts to improve respect for fundamental freedoms in many problem
countries around the world.'
' 7
Following the President's announcement, the Bush Administration
forwarded the ICCPR to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, together
with an attached package of limiting "reservations," "declarations" and
"understandings." These limitations are, in many respects, similar to
those that had been recommended by President Carter They were so
extensive that some human rights activists feared that ratification subject
to them would be an empty gesture, at best. For example, the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, a U.S.-based international human rights
organization, urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not to
recommend ratification, in light of the extensive limitations. The Chairman
of the Lawyers Committee explained:
The Lawyers Committee emphatically endorses the view that ratification of
the Covenant would underscore our national commitment to promoting
12. See generally RiCHA"t B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIwrS INSTRUMENTS:
A CoMPILATIoN OF TREATIES, AGREEMENTS & DECLARATIONS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE
UNITED STATES (rev ed. 1988).
13. See Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S. 1, OEA/ser.A/16 (English) (1970), reprinted in
9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
14. See David Weissbrodt, U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63
MINN. L. REv 35 (1978).
15. See Dennis DeConcini & Steny H. Hoyer, Time to Ratify U.N. Human Rights
Covenants, CiusTIA Sci. MoNIToR, Apr. 18, 1990, at 19.
16. U.S. Department of State Dispatch (Sept. 16, 1991) (Statement by Deputy Spokes-
man Richard Boucher, Sept. 10, 1991).
17. Id.
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human rights in U.S. foreign policy.
We are deeply concerned, however, by the reservations, declarations and
understandings proposed by the Administration. We believe that only one
reservation, relating to limitations on free speech in Article 20 of the
Covenant, is constitutionally required. The other qualifications proposed by
the Administration are all designed to support the Admimstration's view that
this treaty should not, in any way, change or commit us to change anything
in U.S. law or practice, now or in the future. It is this principle that we
strongly oppose. Ratification, subject to the reservations proposed by the
Admimstration, would render the treaty forever useless as a tool to improve
human rights in the United States.
The Administration's qualifying language applies one set of rules to the
United States and another set of rules to the rest of the world. No other
nation has taken this view. We believe it is wrong; it undermines the
basic purpose of the treaty.
We oppose the Administration's approach on [several] grounds. First,
we believe that other countries, including our closest allies, will view ratifi-
cation in this manner as hypocritical. Second, our ratification subject
to the principle of "no domestic application" may be imitated cynically by
other states, such as China or Cuba, which [also] seek the diplomatic benefits
of ratification but cling to the view that adherence to international human
rights standards violates their sovereignty We would scorn any ratification
by other countries, such as China, if they included reservations identical to
those proposed by the Adnmistration.
Reluctantly, we have come to conclude that if the choice before the
Senate is now between ratifying the Covenant subject to the Administration's
misguided principle or delaying ratification until the most objectionable
reservations are removed, we support delay.' 8
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Bush
Administration proposal in November, 1991, and subsequently
recommended its approval by the full Senate. On April 2, 1992, the Senate
consented to U.S. ratification of the ICCPR, subject to all the limitations
that the Bush Adrmmstration had proposed. On June 8, 1992, the Executive
Branch formally deposited the United States' instrument of ratification
with the United Nations, thus completing our nation's ratification process.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Report on the ICCPR
expressly recognizes that U.S. law is in some respects less rights-protective
than the ICCPR and that the qualifications attached to U.S. ratification
exempt the U.S. from the higher international standard. However, the
report suggests that these discrepancies should be remedied through
subsequent legislation:
The Committee recognizes the importance of adhering to internationally
recognized standards of human rights. Although the U.S. record of adherence
18. Letter from Marvin E. Frankel, Chairman, Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights,
to Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (Mar. 2, 1992)
(on file with author).
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has been good, there are some areas in which U.S. law differs from the
international standard. For example, the Covenant prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons below the age of
eighteen but U.S. law allows it for juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18.
In areas such as these, it may be appropriate and necessary to question
whether changes in U.S. law should be made to bring the United States into
full compliance at the international level. However, the Committee anticipates
that changes in U.S. law in these areas will occur through the normal
legislative process.
The approach taken by the Administration and the Committee in its
resolution of ratification will enable the United States to ratify the Covenant
promptly and to participate with greater effectiveness in the process of
shaping international norms and behavior in the area of human rights. It
does not preclude the United States from modifying its obligations under
the Covenant in the future if changes in U.S. law allow the United States
to come into full compliance.' 9
One of the practical reasons why the U.S. has so far failed to
meaningfully ratify the covenants is that there has not been a very active
constituency pressing for such action based on the covenants' impact
specifically in the domestic sphere. The domestically-based international
human rights groups have provided pressure for ratification. However, in
support of that goal, these organizations stress non-domestic
considerations-namely, concerns of international human rights (i.e., the
rights of individuals in other countries) and foreign policy I refer to
organizations such as Amnesty International U.S.A., Human Rights Watch,
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and other groups that monitor
human rights violations by non-U.S. governments. 20
The international human rights groups emphasize that the U.S.'s ability
to exercise its considerable, or at least potentially considerable, Influence
in persuading other governments to comply with human rights norms is
severely undermined by the U.S. government's failure to ratify these basic
documents. The U.S. has a series of statutes that limit aid and trade
benefits to governments that consistently commit gross human rights
violations.2' However, our credibility in using these or other levers to
affect other countries' human rights practices is undermined by our non-
ratification of the covenants. One example of this adverse impact of non-
ratification is in U.S. efforts to improve the human rights situation in
China. Every time the U.S. tries to raise this subject with Chinese officials
or diplomats, they routinely say, "You have no standing to challenge our
19. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1992), reprinted In 31 I.L.M. 645, 650 (1992).
20. Statement of the ACLU, supra note 11.
21. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 §§ 116(a), 502B(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §§
2151n(a), 2304(a)(2) (1988) (denying economic aid and military/security assistance, respec
tively to countries that demonstrate "a consistent pattern of gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights").
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practices. You have not even become party to the two basic United
Nations covenants on human rights."2
Another reason why U.S. ratification of the covenants would be helpful
from a foreign policy and international human rights perspective is that
the U.S. then could participate in the important process of implementing
these covenants. Implementation involves both a more detailed elaboration
and refinement of the substantive norms governing international human
rights and the development of new international procedural mechanisms
for actually enforcing those norms. Currently, as a non-participant in the
implementation process, the U.S. is not able to shape its development. 3
Yet another disadvantage of U.S. non-ratification of the covenants, in
terms of foreign policy and international human rights concerns, is the
lost opportunity to persuade other countries to become parties. Although
many have already done so, there are still many that have not.
24
III. ADVANTAGES OF RATIFICATION IN TERMS oF DOMESTIC HUMAN
RIGHTS
I wanted to mention, but not to emphasize, the considerations in favor
of ratification in terms of promoting human rights in other countries. I
want to emphasize, instead, another reason for ratification, which is very
important but often overlooked: ratification should enhance the civil
liberties and civil rights of people here in the U.S. Accordingly, I hope
that the ACLU and other domestic human rights organizations will become
an active, strong constituency urging the ratification of these treaties as
important instruments to add to the arsenal of tools for advancing rights
here at home. In fact, the ACLU submitted testimony to the Senate
Judiciary Committee supporting U.S. ratification of the ICCPR without
most of the reservations proposed by the Bush Administration" and
cooperated with other domestic civil rights and civil liberties organizations
in formulating strategy for promoting U.S. ratification.
Now that we have a Supreme Court that consistently interprets, or
rather misinterprets, the U.S. Bill of Rights as not providing much security
for human rights,26 it is especially important to develop alternative human
rights norms, and institutions for enforcing them, which are more protective.
22. Statement of the ACLU, supra note I1.
23. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the U.S., Executive
Summary of Legal Position of the International Human Rights Law Group (Sept. 30,
1991).
24. Id.
25. Statement of the ACLU, supra nole 11.
26. See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock
to Meaningful Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1991); Nadine
Strossen, The Free Speech Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 1991 Y.B. oN FREE
SPEECH 83; Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 805, 866-903 (1990) [hereinafter Judicial Protection].
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For this reason, U.S. ratification of the International Bill of Rights would
be an eminently fitting celebration of the bicentennial of the U.S. Bill of
Rights. The bicentennial occurred on December 15, 1991. Coincidentally,
that was only one day removed from the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
United Nations' adoption of the international covenants on December 16,
1966. I believe that this link in terms of timing is an appropriate symbol
of the close relationship between the two Bills of Rights.
A. A CL U's Role in Protecting Domestic Human Rights
Some friends in the audience for the Cannon Lecture said they thought
it would be helpful if I would briefly explain something about the ACLU's
work to give you some perspective on why the International Bill of Rights
would facilitate it. Therefore, I'll give you a thumbnail sketch. 27 I think
the ACLU's unique role is best summarized by the fact that, of all the
important human rights organizations in this country, it is the only one
that advocates all civil liberties for all people. There are many fine
organizations that concentrate on particular rights, such as free speecit,
religious freedom and so forth. Likewise, many other important
orgamzations concentrate on defending rights for a particular group of
people, such as African Americans, women, Native Americans, and so
on.
The ACLU, though, is the only organization that attempts to defend
the entire spectrum of fundamental human rights for all individuals,
recognizing that all such rights are inextricably interconnected. As a
constitutional law professor, I can attest to the historical accuracy of this
premise underlying the ACLU's broad mission-the indivisibility of all
rights. American constitutional history demonstrates that governmental
violation of a particular right of a particular individual ultimately endangers
all rights for all individuals.
One relatively simple way I can indicate the breadth of the ACLU's
human rights work is to list the various special projects within the national
ACLU, each focusing on a particular set of civil liberties issues. These
projects deal with AIDS, aliens' and immigrants' rights, arts censorship,
children's rights, the death penalty, the rights of lesbians and gay men,
national security, prisoners' rights, privacy and technology, race and
poverty, reproductive freedom, voting rights, women's rights and rights
in the workplace.
The ACLU argues more cases in the U.S. Supreme Court than any
other entity, except the U.S. government. In addition, until last year, the
ACLU won most of the Supreme Court cases in which it was involved.
Last year, for the first time in recent history, the ACLU lost more than
fifty percent of such cases. Given the current composition of the U.S.
Supreme Court and its hostility toward many human rights claims, the
27 For a comprehensive study, see SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AmERiCAN
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990).
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ACLU generally does not seek Supreme Court review, _but more often
than not now appears in the Court at the initiative of its adversaries."8
B. U.S. Supreme Court's Increasingly Narrow Interpretation of U.S.
Bill of Rights
The foregoing facts about the ACLU's declining success rate before the
Supreme Court point to a major reason for the increased importance of
turning to international human rights regimes: the Supreme Court's
increasing inhospitability toward human rights. During its 1990-91 term,
the Court directly overturned more of its own precedents than it had ever
overturned in any previous term; it overruled seven of its own precedents. 9
On the last day of the 1990-91 term, in Payne v Tennessee,30 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist announced that the Court would henceforth be
more willing to overturn its past precedents. In the past, the Court had
said it would overrule precedents only under extraordinary circumstances,
which did not include a change in the Court's personnel and in their
judicial philosophies.3 ' In short, the mere fact that the Court's current
members disagreed with previous decisions would not have warranted
overruling them.3 2 In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that the
Court now feels free to overturn earlier rulings with which the current
majority disagrees.33
This prompted Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his last dissent before
resigning from the Supreme Court, to issue a blistering criticism of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's new approach.Y Justice Marshall said that the Court
was ignoring its lustoric role as a "protector of the powerless," 3 and he
issued a list of what he called "endangered precedents, ' 3 6 earlier rulings
that would satisfy Chief Justice Rehnquist's new, looser criteria for
overruling. These precedents included many landmark decisions
guaranteeing civil rights and civil liberties.
Justice John Paul Stevens, a judicial moderate, appointed by a Republican
President, echoed Justice Marshall's dismay in his separate dissent. Justice
28. Stephen A. Holmes, Frustrated by Federal Courts, ACLU Looks to States on
Individual Rights, N.Y Tnwus, Sept. 30, 1991, at A14.
29. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 11I S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (overruling Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983)); Payne v. Tennessee, 1II S. Ct. 2597 (overruling Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987), & South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)), reh'g denied,
112 S. Ct. 28 (1991); Coleman v. Thompson, III S. Ct. 2546 (overruling Fay v. Nola,
372 U.S. 391 (1963)), reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 27 (1991); California v. Acevedo, III S.
Ct. 1982 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)); Arizona v.
Fulminante, III S. Ct. 1246 (overruling Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967);
United States v.. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)), reh'g dented, I II S. Ct. 2067 (1991).
30. 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991).
31. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 2619, 2622 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2609-11.
34. Id. at 2619-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2623 & n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Stevens concluded that the Payne decision marked "a sad day for a great
institution.""17 Both dissenters agreed that the Court was abandomng the
role it has played throughout the last half century as the ultimate guarantor
of individual and nunority group rights against the "tyranny of the
majority" through vigorous enforcement of the Bill of Rights.
38
Not only is the Rehnquist Court directly overturmng Supreme Court
precedents in record numbers, but it is also overturmng even more
precedents indirectly In many such cases, the Court pays lip service to
precedent, but so substantially "reinterprets" them that they are, in fact,
stripped of force. Dramatic examples of that approach include the Court's
most recent decisions regarding the ongoing vitality of Roe v Wade,
39
the 1973 decision recognizing that a woman's right to choose an abortion
is a fundamental right. These decisions are Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,40 Rust v Sullivan4Q and Planned Parenthood v Casey 42 None
of them expressly stated that Roe was overturned; to the contrary, the
plurality opimon in Webster asserted that Roe was still good law, 43 and
the unusual three-person opimon for the Court in Casey asserted that
Roe's "essential holding" continued in force." In fact, though, all three
decisions upheld restrictions on the right to choose an abortion that are
so burdensome as to belie the fundamental status of that nght from a
constitutional law perspective. More significantly, from the viewpoint of
many women, such a theoretical right has no practical significance, because
of the numerous obstacles to its exercise that the Court has condoned.
The fact that the Court has in effect, albeit not expressly, eviscerated
Roe has been acknowledged by justices from opposite ends of the spectrum
in terms of the merits of the issue (i.e., whether Roe was correctly decided
and whether it should be reaffirmed). In the Webster case, Justice Harry
Blackmun, Roe's author, repudiated the plurality's assertion that it was
not overturning Roe.45 Charging that the Court indirectly and evasively
accomplished such result, his dissent took the plurality to task for stealthily
sabotaging precedent:
Never in my memory has a plurality gone about its business in such
a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review the plurality obscures
the portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plurality announces
that its analysis leaves Roe "undisturbed," [b]ut tis disclaimer is totally
meamngless. The plurality opinion is filled with winks, and nods, and
knowing glances to those who would do away with Roe explicitly
37. Id. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2625 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
41. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
42. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
43. Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (plurality).
44. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
45. See Webster 492 U.S. at 521 (plurality).
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Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a landmark
case of the last generation."
Justice Blackmun's charge that the Rehnquist Court is effectively, if
not expressly, undermining Roe was reiterated in his dissent in Rust v.
Sullivan4 7 the 1991 decision that upheld the Department of Health and
Human Services' "gag rule" prohibiting health professionals at federally
funded family planning climcs from giving their patients any information
about abortion, even if abortion is a medically indicated option. Justice
Blackmun wrote: "If a right is found to be unenforceable, even against
flagrant attempts by government to circumvent it, then it ceases to be a
right at all." 4
In the Court's most recent abortion ruling, Planned Parenthood v
Casey,4 9 decided in June of 1992, this theme that it was actually sabotaging
Roe, notwithstanding its refusal to candidly acknowledge that fact, was
taken up by Chief Justice Rehnquist. As one of the two dissenters in Roe
itself, Chief Justice Rehnquist could hardly disagree with Justice Blackmun
more fundamentally on the merits of that decision. However, despite their
sharp ideological differences, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist are in
complete accord with each other as to Roe's current eviscerated status.
In Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist described the Court's effective, albeit
unacknowledged, overturning of Roe as follows:
While purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint opinion instead revises
it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western
movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality. Decisions
following Roe are frankly overruled in part
Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin Village, which may be
pointed out to passers by as a monument to the importance of adhering to
precedent. But behind the facade, an entirely new method of analysis
is imported. 0
As indicated by Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, the onerous restrictions
on abortion that the Court upheld in Casey, under its new, deferential
standard of review, had previously been held unconstitutional under Roe's
strict scrutiny approach."
46. Id. at 538, 557 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
48. Id. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
50. Id. at 2860 (citations omitted), 2866-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
51. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (holding unconstitutional mandated information and reporting requirements
which "pose an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise" of a woman's right to
choose an abortion); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(24-hour waiting period and requirement that prescribed information be provided by
physicians only held unconstitutional).
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Because of its aggressive overturning of rights-protective precedents,
both directly and indirectly, the Supreme Court no longer can be relied
on to secure human rights. Its narrow interpretation of the Bill of Rights,
and of the federal courts' role in enforcing those rights, mirrors the view
of the entire federal judiciary, approximately seventy percent of whose
judges have been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush pursuant to
specific campaign pledges to name judges who adhere to narrow views of
judicially enforceable, constitutionally based human rights. Therefore, to
secure domestic human rights, one must look to alternative sources of
protection, other than the U.S. Bill of Rights, and to alternative forums
other than federal courts.
C. Domestic Human Rights Organizations' Increasing Reliance on
Alternatives to Federal Judicial Enforcement of U.S. Bill of Rights
As I am fond of telling my constitutional law students, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the U.S. Constitution defines a floor for our
rights, not a ceiling. All the Supreme Court does in its decisions is to set
a level below which other government officials may not sink in protecting
individual and minority group rights. Nothing is to stop such officials
from choosing to give greater protection to rights than the Supreme Court
says they have to, as a matter of federal constitutional law For example,
Congress may pass legislation that protects rights across the country State
legislatures may accomplish the same result within their state borders.
In light of the federal courts' recent narrow interpretations of federal
constitutional rights, the ACLU and other domestic human rights
organizations are placing increasing reliance on alternative avenues for
rights protection.52 It would be helpful to add the International Bill of
Rights to that array of alternative approaches. Before focusing on the
international tools directly, I would like to comment on one of the other
alternative strategies, since I believe it constitutes a particularly persuasive
precedent for reliance on international human rights. I am referring to
state courts' interpretations of their state constitutions.
Many state constitutions contain language that is explicitly more rights-
protective than the U.S. Constitution." Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized that state courts are free to interpret their constitutions as
affording more protection for human rights than the U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to afford, even if the pertinent
provisions in the two constitutions are identical. 4 That is because the
state constitution may be interpreted in light of state history and traditions
that would shed a different meaning on the words than the meaning
assigned them by the U.S. Supreme Court.
5
52. Holmes, supra note 28.
53. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
54. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HAnv L. REv 489 (1977).
55. Id. at 495.
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The movement to rely on state constitutional interpretation as a vehicle
for expanding human rights started to develop momentum about fifteen
years ago. When it was first advanced by some judges and scholars, not
that long ago, it seemed as visionary as the notion of similarly relying on
international human rights may seem now Certainly, when I went to law
school in the early 1970's, no one studied state constitutions. Since then,
though, there has been an influential movement to educate lawyers and
judges to consider state constitutions in human rights cases. One early
proponent of that movement was Supreme Court Justice William Brennan."6
Another early proponent, as well as practitioner, was Justice Hans Linde,
who then sat on the Oregon Supreme Court. 7 Justice Linde made a big
impact on U.S. lawyers by saying that if you bring a human rights case
and do not rely on your state constitution, you really are committing
malpractice.
58
Not surprisingly, given the 'link between the two strategies for protecting
domestic human rights, Justice Linde has been an advocate for using
international human rights m some of the same ways that state constitutional
standards have been used.5' Probably because international human rights
law is more exotic than state constitutional law, Justice Linde has expressed
Is warning to lawyers in somewhat toned-down language. He says, if
you are advocating a human rights case m the U.S. and do not rely on
the relevant principles of international human rights law, you are "skating
on the thin edge of malpractice." ' w So, as Justice Linde recognizes, we
have not yet incorporated international human rights law into our domestic
law as fully as we have incorporated state constitutional law What is
required to more fully integrate international standards into domestic law
is the same process of acculturation and education as has already made
great strides, in the recent past, concermng state constitutional law
Although the movement to incorporate international human rights norms
into the domestic legal culture lags behind that of incorporating state
constitutional norms, it too has made enormous strides in the past two
decades. When I was in law school, there were no courses on international
human rights law, either at my alma mater, Harvard Law School, or
elsewhere. Now Harvard Law School is one of many that has a formal
program in international human rights, with many courses, faculty
members, law reviews and clinical programs focusing on the area. Few
law schools do not regularly offer courses in the area.
56. See, e.g., id. at 502.
57 Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of
Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. Prrr. L. Rsiv 729, 733 (1988).
58. Id. See also State v. Lowry, 667 P.2d 996 (Or. 1983); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d
233 (Vt. 1985).
59. Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTi~rs CONST.
L.Q. 391 (1988).
60. Spaeth, supra note 57, at 733.
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D. Enhancement of Domestic Human Rights by Incorporation of
International Human Rights Norms
One of the reasons why the U.S. is lagging in its support for international
human rights treaties is the attitude that we are so much freer here than
are residents of other countries, so we do not need these international
protections. This objection raises an important point-that international
human rights norms would be incorporated into domestic law only to the
extent that the international standards are more protective of individual
or minority group rights than the domestic standards. 6 To the extent that
international human rights standards are less protective than the
corresponding U.S. norms, the former would not supersede the latter. To
clarify this, the U.S. should qualify its ratification of any international
human rights treaty by making a reservation to provisions that are less
rights-protective than domestic law The ICCPR includes one such provision
that was appropriately the subject of an express U.S. reservation; article
20 excludes hate speech and war propaganda from free speech protection,
in contrast with American law 62
Again, the incorporation of state constitutional norms affords an
instructive analogy State constitutional standards regarding human rights
may deviate from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
Constitution only in the direction of ratcheting up (i.e., giving more
protection for rights). 63 The same is true of international human rights.
Therefore, the question of whether international human rights standards
are more protective than the corresponding domestic standards is important.
Having had experience in international human rights work in many
parts of the world, I believe that the U.S. in general is the freest society
on earth, a fact that makes me feel very patriotic. However, this
generalization does not diminish the importance of relying on international
human rights as a vehicle for securing and expanding domestic rights for
two important reasons. First, a major-if not the major-factor accounting
for the high level of human rights in the U.S. is the work of the ACLU
and other domestic human nghts organizations, which has helped to
translate the Bill of Rights' paper guarantees of liberty into actual rights
for real people. The second, related point is that the Supreme Court's
increasingly narrow interpretation of the U.S. Bill of Rights will multiply
the instances in which international human rights norms are more protective.
Thus, international human rights norms may provide essential new tools
for the human rights organizations in the U.S. I would like to expand on
both of these points.
Elaboration on the first point-the crucial role that domestic
organizations have played in securing actual governmental respect for
rights-is not only important in the context of my particular discussion,
61. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 89 (1957).
62. Statement of the A CL U, supra note 11, at 3.
63. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975).
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but is also consistent with a principal theme of the Cannon Lectures in
general: emphasis on the limitations of our legal system and on the
humanistic dimensions of that system. To be sure, since its adoption two
hundred years ago, the U.S. Bill of Rights has been an important potential
tool for securing individual and nunority group rights. However, like all
tools, whether its potential is realized depends on whether and how it is
used. In fact, the Bill of Rights was not used to secure personal liberties
and minority group rights until human rights organizations provided the
resources to make that possible, chiefly by providing lawyers to victims
of rights violations.
The crucial role that domestic human rights organizations played in
translating the Bill of Rights' promises into reality is indicated by
considering the status of human rights before the advent of such
orgamzations during the early decades of this century Although the Bill
of Rights declared rights to exist almost from the nation's beginning, as
was recogmzed by their principal author, James Madison, these declarations
constituted mere "parchment barners"64 against governmental interference
with liberty These guarantees were not self-executing, and, for much of
our nation's history, there simply were no systematic means for seeking
their judicial enforcement. Accordingly, the actual state of human rights
in this country was deplorable for most of our history
For example, when the ACLU was founded in 1920, there was racial
apartheid by law in many parts of the country, there were rampant
lynchings and other race-motivated violence, women did not have the
right to vote and women were arrested for discussing birth control in
public. Workers who had been fired for advocating unions had no remedy,
the police conducted warrantless searches of homes, the government
routinely deported non-citizens because of their political views, and Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer conducted notorious nationwide raids to arrest-
communists and labor orgamzers. During World War I, thousands of
people were prosecuted and imprisoned merely for peaceful expression of
anti-war views.65 .
In short, the mere enactment of the Bill of Rights did not guarantee
human rights. What was required, in addition, were individuals and
organizations willing and able to take the necessary action to secure actual
governmental respect for rights. Now that human rights can no longer be
entrusted to federal judicial interpretation of the U.S. Bill of Rights,
domestic human rights activists must turn to other channels, including
international human rights.
Thus, we come to the second point-that in certain significant respects
U.S. rights standards are less protective than are the comparable
international norms. 6 While the trend of the Rehnquist Court's rulings is
64. 1 Annals of Congress 457 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (statement of James Madison).
65. See AMERICAN CrvW LmERTiES UNION, BRiEuauG PAPER No. 9, A HISTORY OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 4 (1991).
66. See generally Judicial Protection, supra note 26.
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toward lesser protection of rights, the trend in international human rights
law appears to be in the opposite direction. One important area where
international law is more rights-protective than domestic law is privacy,
especially in the sense of personal autonomy and decisions about sexuality
Other areas where international human rights law is more protective than
domestic law include the death penalty, 67 prisoners' rights, 6 the rights of
other institutionalized individuals such as mental patients 69 and certain
aspects of criminal procedure. 70
Let me give you two recent, dramatic examples of areas in which the
Supreme Court's defimtions of domestic rights are much narrower than
the corresponding international standards. One involves personal privacy
in the sense of sexual autonomy and control over one's body In 1986,
in Bowers v Hardwck,71 the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional
right of privacy does not include the right to engage in consensual
homosexual activity 72 The opimons of the justices who voted to support
that conclusion contained sweeping, condemnatory language about
homosexuality Chief Justice Warren Burger's concurring opinion asserted
that such sexual conduct had been universally condemned "throughout
the history of western civilization." 73 This opinion neglected to mention
that, five years earlier, the European Court of Human Rights had held
that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is guaranteed under the
European Convention on Human Rights and accordingly invalidated an
anti-sodomy law that had been enacted by Northern Ireland. 74
Another, more recent illustration of the divergence between relatively
unprotective domestic rights interpretations by the Rehnquist Court, and
more protective interpretations of international norms, is afforded by
contrasting Rust v Sullivan7s with a virtually simultaneous decision by
the European Commission on Human Rights. The Supreme Court held
that personnel at government-funded family planning clinics do not have
a right to speak about the availability of abortion as an option, even
when that option is medically indicated for a particular patient.7 6 The
Court ruled that the First Amendment's free speech guarantee does not
extend to the provision of information about abortion at government-
funded family planning clinics. The European Commission on Human
Rights adopted a strikingly different position in a case from Ireland.
67 Statement of the ACLU, supra note 11, at 6.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 8.
71. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
72. Id. at 192-95.
73. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
74. See Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (invalidating Northern Ireland
law). Accord, Norris Case, 129 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (invalidating Irish statute
criminalizing consensual homosexual contact between adult males).
75. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
76. Id. at 1777-78.
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Ireland's Constitution provides that the right to life begins at conception,
so abortion is prohibited as a matter of Irish constitutional law 71 The
European Commission nonetheless held that it violated the international
human rights norms secured by the European Convention on Human
Rights, to which Ireland is a signatory, for the Irish government to
prohibit health professionals from giving information to Irish women
about getting abortions in other countries, such as the United Kingdom .
7
In October of 1992, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed the
Commission's judgment.79 Contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's cramped
interpretation of the First Amendment's free speech guarantee, the European
Court held that the European Convention's free speech guarantee extends
to the provision of information about abortion, even in countries where
abortion violates both the constitution and criminal laws.
What a particularly dramatic contrast there is between these two cases!
In the U.S., women have a constitutionally guaranteed right to choose an
abortion, yet the millions of poor women whose only access to health
care and information is at federally funded climcs are deprived of
information about that constitutionally guaranteed option. In contrast,
for a woman to have an abortion in Ireland would violate the fetus'
constitutional rights, yet Irish women nevertheless have the right to receive
information about obtaining abortions elsewhere.
Just as international human rights law in general contains certain added
rights protections, beyond those afforded by current U.S. law, so, too,
the ICCPR contains some added rights guarantees. If the U.S. had ratified
the ICCPR without limitations on its rights-enhancing provisions, it would
have expanded the rights of Americans in many significant respects. If
enacted, the International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1992 would
accomplish U.S. compliance with the ICCPR, and thus augment Americans'
rights, in the following ways: it would prohibit the execution of juvenile
offenders and of pregnant women; it would incorporate international
standards of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment into
U.S. law; it would require the retroactive imposition of lighter criminal
penalties; it would afford compensation for unlawful arrests and for
convictions resulting from the miscarriage of justice; it would, in most
instances,8° prohibit successive prosecutions by federal and state authorities;
77 The constitutional provision at issue, which came into force following a 1983
referendum, reads as follows:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the
equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.
IR. CONST. art. 40.3.30
78. Open Door Counselling Ltd. v. Ireland, 14 E.H.R.R. 131 (1991).
79. Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
80. The Act specifies that it "does not preclude successive prosecution under federal
law when the Attorney General of the United States has determined that such prosecution
is necessary to enforce rights protected under the United States Constitution, this Act, or
any other Federal civil rights statute." Int'l Human Rights Conformity Act of 1992 §
108(c) (1992).
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and it would require jails and prisons to separate juvenile from adult
offenders and defendants awaiting trial from those who had already been
convicted.
I hope I have given you a sense of the great potential for using
international human rights law as a more expansive tool for protecting
important rights in the U.S. than the Rehnquist Court's version of the
U.S. Bill of Rights has become. In the remainder of this article, I will
elaborate on two specific dimensions of this subject: first, a critical analysis
of the U.S.'s failure to meaningfully ratify the International Bill of Rights;
and second, an outline of the important role that international human
rights norms can play in domestic law, even without U.S. treaty ratification.
IV CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. FAILURE TO MEANINGFULLY RATIFY
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS
I will now outline the history of the U.S. failure to meaningfully ratify
the International Bill of Rights, the proffered reasons for that failure and
the flaws in such reasons. Initially, I will sketch the background of the
International Bill of Rights, and the U.S.'s important role in its
development.
Appalled by the atrocities of World War II, U.S. officials played a
leading role in forming the United Nations and in ensuring that the
promotion of human rights would be an essential element of the U.N.
Charter 8I Shortly after the U.N.'s formation, a U.N. Commission on
Human Rights was established to draft the International Bill of Rights.
The U.S. representative to the U.N., Eleanor Roosevelt, was the chairperson
of this commission. She convinced the other members that the International
Bill of Rights should consist of both a declaration enunciating general
principles and treaties setting out more specific guarantees for implementing
those principles.82
In accordance with Eleanor Roosevelt's vision, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights was adopted on December 10, 1948. It proclaimed that
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights all constitute one
indivisible body of rights and that their protection is necessary for the
preservation of human dignity and world peace. Borrowing from President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's famous "Four Freedoms" speech in 1941,
the Universal Declaration states:
Disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts
which have outraged the conscience of mankind. The advent of a world in
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people.83
81. See SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 9, at 506-09.
82. Richard N. Gardner, Eleanor Roosevelt's Legacy. Human Rights, N.Y TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1988, at 27
83. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
56 (1948).
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The two specific covenants that were designed to implement the ideals
pronounced in the Umversal Declaration, the ICCPR and the ICESCR,
were drafted dunng the 1950's and adopted by the U.N. in 1966. By
1976, enough countries had ratified the covenants for them to come into
force.
The ICCPR is modeled on the U.S. Bill of Rights. It guarantees the
following rights: freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; freedom of movement; due process of law;
privacy; and freedom of thought, expression, assembly, association and
religion. All these rights are guaranteed to all human beings, regardless
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status. Each signatory state
pledges that whenever these rights are violated, an effective remedy will
be available.Y
The ICESCR was influenced by President Franklin Roosevelt's Economic
Bill of Rights, proposed in January, 1944. It includes the right to adequate
food, clothing, recreation, medical care, education, social security and a
decent home. The ICESCR guarantees the following rights: just and
favorable work conditions; formation and joining of trade unions; social
security; adequate standard of living; access to the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health; and education. Like the rights
secured by the ICCPR, those protected under the ICESCR are guaranteed
to all without discrimnation. Unlike the rights secured by the ICCPR,
which become effective immediately upon a nation's ratification, those
protected under the ICESCR are to be progressively implemented by each
ratifying country "to the maximum of its available resources. '"85
Prior to the fall of 1991, the two U.N. covenants had been twice
discussed in the Senate: first, in the 1950's, shortly after they were drafted,
and secondly, in 1979, after they were proposed by the Carter
Administration. Recently, two social scientists, Natalie Hevener Kaufman
and David Whiteman, systematically analyzed all the arguments that were
raised against ratification during those two sets of hearings." They
concluded that the covenants were rejected in the 1950's due to concerns
about domestic and foreign policy that are no longer relevant. However,
strikingly, they found that the very same concerns resurfaced in 1979 as
major reasons for again failing to- ratify In other words, a momentum
had developed behind the negative arguments initially proffered in the
1950's, which transcended the arguments' actual persuasive value.Y
During the covenants' first consideration in the Senate in the 1950's,
the leading opponent of ratification was an elected official from this state,
84. Statement of the A CLU, supra note 11, at 53.
85. Id.
86. Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights
Treaties in the U.S. Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Agreement, 10 Hum. RTs. Q. 309
(1988).
87 Id. at 310-12.
Fall 19921
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW
Ohio Senator John Bricker. He was the proponent of a series of resolutions
that would have amended the U.S. Constitution to limit the treaty-making
power These proposals reflected two basic concerns, which also prompted
Senator Bricker to oppose U.S. ratification of human rights treaties. One
of his concerns dealt with domestic policy, the other with foreign policy
Domestically, Senator Bricker was very concerned about treaties-
especially those dealing with human rights-being used to limit "states'
rights." 88 Back in the 1950's, 'that was a buzzword in the context of the
then-nascent civil rights movement. This was even before Brown v. Board
of Education"9 held that governmental race discrimination was
unconstitutional, and well before the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited
much private sector racial discrimination. Bncker and others who supported
his amendment were especially concerned about the guarantees of racial
equality in the International Bill of Rights. Before the Supreme Court's
1954 ruling that racially segregated public schools violated the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, there was no domestic legal authority
for challenging most racial discrimination. Therefore, Thurgood Marshall,
Jack Greenberg and the other NAACP lawyers who were fighting racial
segregation relied specifically on international law principles, including
those set out in the United Nations Charter. Bricker and others feared
that U.S. ratification of the covenants would speed the domestic civil
rights movement, which they were not supporting.
The second reason for Senator Bricker's opposition to the covenants
was grounded in foreign policy concerns. During the 1950's the U.S. was,
of course, in the Cold War. Senator Bricker and his allies viewed the
international covenants as increasing the Soviet bloc's power.9'
Even in the 1950's, when Senator Bricker initially raised these arguments
against U.S. ratification of the covenants, I think there were some severe
problems with them. A fortiori, these arguments were even weaker when
they were resurrected more than two decades later to forestall President
Carter's request that the Senate ratify the covenants. The lack of
persuasiveness of Senator Bricker's reasons for opposing U.S. ratification
of the covenants in the 1950's is indicated by the fact that even President
Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, initially believed that
the covenants should be ratified. However, because of the political strength
of Senator Bricker and his allies, the Eisenhower Admimstration made a
deal with them. The Administration refused to support Senator Bricker's
proposed constitutional amendment, but, as a concession to the concerns
underlying the amendment, the Administration agreed not to push for
ratification of the human rights covenants. 9'
Even assuming that there was some merit to Senator Bricker's anti-
ratification arguments back in the 1950's, it seems incontrovertible that
88. Id. at 315.
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
90. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 86, at 313, 326-27.
91. Id. at 319.
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neither of those arguments has any force whatsoever today First, our
own Constitution has been interpreted as guaranteeing racial equality and
prohibiting racial discrimination by state governments; the argument that
"states' rights" include the right to engage m racial discrimination has
been resoundingly rejected. Thus, the racial equality norms in the
international covenants no longer deviate from U.S. law as they did in
the early 1950's. Second, from a foreign policy point of view, the Cold
War is over, and we have entered a "new world order" in which countering
the power of the former Soviet bloc should no longer be of such great
importance to the U.S. As a leading international law scholar and expert
on Soviet law has written:
It has been said that the participation of the Soviet Umor is proof
of the worthlessness of [international human rights treaties]. It has been
said that international instruments embody socialistic notions that are not
really "rights" at all. It has also been said that the Soviet Umon
would exploit U.S. adherence for propagandistic uses of [its] own. By
relying on these and other arguments that presuppose continued ideological
struggle between two hostile blocs, opponents have prevented the most
important human rights treaties from becoming part of "the supreme Law
of the Land," and the few that have been allowed to squeak by are fettered
with debilitating reservations aimed at riummzing their effectiveness as law
in the United States.
These objections never withstood scrutiny even dunng the height of the
Cold War, and today they carry no force whatsoeverP1
Despite all the reasons for rejecting Senator Bricker's arguments today
(let alone when they were initially made), those arguments continue to
exert influence now, four decades later. This was the conclusion of the
Kaufman and Whiteman article. The article quoted Senator Bricker as
stating, when introducing his first constitutional amendment in 1951. "My
purpose in offering this resolution is to bury the so-called covenant on
human rights so deep that no one holding high public office will ever
dare to attempt its resurrection." 93 Almost forty years later, Kaufman
and Whiteman concluded: "As we consider the status of the human rights
covenants today, it would appear that the ghost of Senator John Bncker
must be smiling at the fulfillment of his wish."' 9 They explained: "Our
main conclusions are that contemporary arguments against passage
of human rights treaties have not changed substantially from arguments
presented in the 1950's, and that the legacy of these earlier deliberations
is still apparent in the attitude of those considering the treaties now "9
Few of the staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are
92. Lori Fisler Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and American
Courts, 100 YALE L.J. 2315, 2334 (1991).
93. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 86, at 309.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 310.
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now familiar with the specifics, of the debate in the 1950's. Instead, the
legacy lies in the near-umversal perception that human rights treaties are
inherently controversial.
In short, Kaufman and Whiteman concluded that the power of the
anti-ratification rhetoric of the 1950's carried forward so that people still
assume the covenants to be vaguely threatening to important interests of
our state and national governments without being aware of the specific
reasons.96 That is the bad news. The good news is that Kaufman and
Whiteman also concluded that the single most important factor in turning
the tide would be presidential support.97 Staff members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee whom they interviewed during the Reagan
Administration said that the Adinistration's lack of interest was the
most important reason the Senate had no plans even to consider, let alone
to approve, the covenants.98
As Kaufman and Whiteman explain, the President's important role in
securing ratification of human rights treaties is supported by the history
of the Genocide Treaty of 1984. Almost immediately after President
Reagan's unexpected endorsement of this treaty, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held hearings on it and recommended ratification
just a few weeks later. Yet, earlier that same year, the Committee's staff
had been pessimistic about securing ratification of the treaty 99 In light of
the foregoing historical evidence, there is a solid basis for hope that a
future administration, which is supportive of human rights, could well
propel ratification of international treaties that protect such rights.
V INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS INTO
DOMESTIC LAW BY THE U.S. LEGAL PROFEssIoN APART FROM TREATY
RATIFICATION
Even before and apart from ratification of the International Bill of
Rights, U.S. lawyers and judges can and should incorporate international
human rights principles into domestic law In addition to positive sources
of international human rights law, such as treaties and covenants,
international human rights law also has an analogue to unwritten common
law in the domestic sphere. In the international law sphere, the unwritten
law is called customary law It consists of those norms that are widely
accepted by the community of civilized nations.10
Treaty provisions are not themselves sources of customary international
law norms; however, they do constitute evidence of the existence of such
norms. The fact that approximately one hundred countries have ratified
96. Id. at 335.
97 Id. at 332-33.
98. Id. at 333.
99 Id.
100. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (TimD) OF FOREiGN RELATION S LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) ("Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.").
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each of the covenants is itself evidence of the widespread acceptance of
these norms and is a basis for concluding that they should be seen as
part of" customary international law
According to the Supreme Court, the three classic types of evidence of
customary international law norms are the works of scholars, the general
usage and practice of nations and judicial decisions.1'0 Other types of
evidence include resolutions of international bodies, national legislation,
public declarations by international and national officials, and diplomatic
documents. ,o2
International junsts have made credible arguments that most, if not all,
international human rights standards have achieved the general recognition
necessary to constitute customary international law norms. Indeed, judges
and scholars have made the stronger argument that most international
human rights principles are included in the subset of customary norms
that are so fundamental as to be nonderogable. 103 These "peremptory"
norms, or "jus cogens," cannot be changed by agreement. 1" Some
international law scholars have argued that the international human rights
standards embodied in the International Bill of Rights are at least "rapidly
establishing" themselves as peremptory norms, if they have not already
attained that status. 05 Not all commentators agree that all international
human rights principles presently constitute nonderogable norms. In
contrast, though, there appears to be a broad consensus among international
law scholars that all such principles are included in customary international
law 06 During the Carter Admimstration, the U.S. government took the
position that both covenants embody customary international law
principles.'07
Customary international norms can be incorporated into domestic law
in two different ways: as directly binding, controlling legal standards, or
i01. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
102. See LuNO-CHu CHEN, Am INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW"
A POLIcY-ORImNTED PERSPECTIVE 362 (1989).
103. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3,
301, 304 (Feb. 5) (Ammoun, J., concurring); South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South
Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 298 (July 18) (Tanaka, J., dissenting);
CHEN, supra note 102, at 215; MYEiks S. McDouGAL r AL., HuMAN RIGHTS Am WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THEBASIC Poucms oF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HuMAN DIGNiTY 345
(1980); Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, 12 HASTINGs INT'L & Como. L. Rnv 411, 441-42 (1989); David F Klein, Comment,
A Theory for the Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by
Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 346-47, 365 (1988).
104. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99 (1969).
105. See Parker & Neylon, supra note 103, at 442.
106. See Sohn, supra note 1, at 12.
107. See Memorial of the United States of America before the International Court of
Justice, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United
States of America v. Iran) (Final Order), 1980 I.C.J. 3; Barbara D. Budros, Comment,
The Former American Hostages' Human Rights Claims Against Iran: Can They Be
Waived? 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 101, 111 n.52 (1981); accord Memorandum for United
States as Amicus Curiae at 307 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980)
(No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 587-601 (1980).
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as non-binding, but influential, standards of interpretation. 03 The theoiy
that customary norms are directly binding means that a government is
bound to comply with such norms, even if it has not ratified an agreement
that explicitly obligates it to do so. This theory is solidly supported by
established international law principles. It also received widespread judicial
enforcement early in U.S. history However, in more recent history, this
direct approach to incorporating customary international law into domestic
jurisprudence has received much less support. Therefore, one should not
expect it to be a significant avenue for integrating international human
rights principles into domestic law in the foreseeable future.' 9
The willingness of U.S. courts to directly enforce customary internationzl
law principles has followed a cyclical pattern throughout history Early
in our history, consistent with the then predominant natural law philosophy,
courts vigorously enforced customary international law standards as directly
binding elements of domestic law 110 In contrast, from about the mia-
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, customary
international law norms played a less vital part in domestic adjudication.
This change reflected the rise of legal positivism, as well as the
"conservative" or "classical" approach to international law, which
emphasized national sovereignty "I Since World War II, U.S. courts have
again become more receptive to international customary law, consistent
with the rejection of legal positivism and the rise of a new internationalism.
Probably the high-water mark for acceptance of the directly binding
nature of customary international human rights norms was the decision
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1980 in Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala."2 The Second Circuit held that a rarely used federal
jurisdictional statute created an implied cause of action for violation of
customary international human rights standards." 3 In so doing, the Second
Circuit revived the incorporatioiust approach to customary international
law which had been prevalent early in our history, but had fallen into
disuse since the nineteenth century The court recognized that international
law, or "the law of nations," is a dynamic concept that should be
construed in accordance with the current customs and usages of civilized
nations, as articulated by jurists and commentators."14 It specifically held
108. See Judicial Protection, supra note 26, at 815-37.
109. Id. at 818-23.
110. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REv 819, 820, 825 (1989).
11I. See Jeffrey M. Bium & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HRv
INT'L L.J. 53, 64-66 (1981); Joan F Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic
Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv 655, 675 n.77 (1983); Jordon J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth
Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REy 231, 236 (1975).
112. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 889-90.
114. Id. at 884.
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that U.S. law directly incorporated customary international law principles
prohibiting deliberate government torture.'
The Filartiga decision created hope in the international law community
that it presaged a trend toward the wholesale domestic incorporation of
customary international human rights law 116 However, that development
has not occurred.1 7 To the contrary, few subsequent decisions have
followed the Filartiga approach of treating customary international law
principles as directly binding on the U.S. government."'
In summary, there is much scholarly support for the view that most
international human rights norms constitute at least binding rules of
customary law-if not, indeed, nonderogable binding rules. Accordingly,
commentators have argued that various international human rights norms
should control in U.S. litigation. However, relatively few courts have
actually enforced this theory in specific cases. Therefore, for the immediate
future, the more promising route for incorporating customary international
human rights norms into domestic law appears to be the indirect route,
under which such norms provide guidance in interpreting domestic legal
standards.
Even positivists, who resist incorporating customary international law
norms into our own domestic laws as directly binding, recognize the
indirect role that such norms can play by providing interpretive standards
for U.S. law 1,9 In other words, to the extent that our own statutes or
constitutional norms are vague ambiguous or incomplete, we can use
customary international law to provide guidance in interpreting or
implementing them.
In 1989, Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Houston Law
Center published a comprehensive survey of the interpretive use of
customary international human rights norms by U.S. courts throughout
history 120 He concluded: "[M]ost of the Supreme Court Justices throughout
our constitutional history have recognized that human rights can provide
useful content for the identification, clarification and supplementation of
constitutional or statutory norms."' 12' Moreover, he showed that the
115. Id. at 884-85.
116. See Steven Scheebaum, Recent Judicial Developments in Human Rights Law, I
LAw GRouP DOCKET 1, 7 (1981). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW Or THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (1987).
117 See Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform
Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. Irr'L L. 39, 40 (1981).
118. See Judicial Protection, supra note 26, at 822 n.81.
119. See HANs KELSEN, PRINCIPLES Or INTERNATIONAL LAW 438-40 (W Tucker ed.,
1966). See also HANs KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 353-55 (M. Knight trans. 1967);
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 145-55 (A. Wedberg trans., 1945);
Neil MacCormick, A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law? 20 VAL. U.L. REv 1, 20
(1985).
120. Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S.
History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
543 (1989).
121. Id. at 596.
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Supreme Court's interpretive reliance on customary international human
rights norms has been steadily increasing.'12 He also demonstrated that
the many Supreme Court Justices who have invoked customary international
human rights concepts have spanned disparate jurisprudential approaches-"
The Rehnquist Court's most recent reference to the interpretive use of
customary international human rights standards was discouraging. The
Court's ruling was consistent with its general trend toward contracting
the judicial protection of rights, as well as with its pattern of departing
from rights-protective precedents.
Until recently, the Court had consistently invoked international human
rights norms in determining whether an application of the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. 12 For example, in Thompson v Oklahoma,"2 in 1988, the
Supreme Court held that a death sentence imposed on an offender who
was fifteen years old at the time of his offense violated the Eighth
Amendment. Writing for the plurality, Justice John Paul Stevens cited
international legal standards in reasoning that the sentence "offend[ed]
civilized standards of decency "126 He noted that the leading western
European countries, as well as the Soviet Union, prohibited executions of
individuals who were juveniles at the time of their crimes. He also cited
two treaties that the U.S. had not ratified that explicitly prohibit juvenile
death penalties-the ICCPR and the American Convention on Human
Rights.'12 7 In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia implied that international
standards should not be taken into account in interpreting the U.S.
Constitution.12
One year later, in Stanford v Kentucky, '2 the Supreme Court concluded
that imposing the death penalty on an individual for a crime committed
while sixteen or seventeen years old does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia, who took this
opportunity to reiterate his views about the irrelevance of international
law and practices in construing the U.S. Constitution. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion, as well as Justice Brennan's dissent, well state the two,
widely divergent, possible views about interpreting domestic law in light
of international customary law. The majority opinion recognized that the
key question in Eighth Amendment analysis is whether the challenged
punishment is contrary to "evolving standards of decency " In determining
what those standards are, Justice Scalia explained, "we have looked not
to our own [i.e., the Justices' own personal] conceptions of decency, but
122. Id. at 588-89.
123. See id. at 590.
124. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v Georgia, 433
U.S. 584. 593 n.4, 596 n.10 (1974).
125. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
126. Id. at 830 (plurality).
127. Id. at 831 n.34.
128. Id. at 863-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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to those of modern American society as a whole.' ' 130 Then, in a footnote
to this sentence, Justice Scalia emphasized his rejection of the theory that
international law even plays an interpretive role in U.S. jurisprudence.
He wrote:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amict that the
sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While "the practices of
other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determimng
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely an historical
accident but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it
occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our
Constitution as well," they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amend-
ment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people.'
31
In contrast, the dissent stated: "Our cases recognize that objective
indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation
in other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis
In addition , three leading human rights treaties ratified or signed by
the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties. 1' 32 The
dissent then recited relevant evidence, including the fact that, since 1979,
Amnesty International has recorded only eight executions of offenders
under eighteen years old throughout the entire world, three of which were
in the U.S. and the remaimng five of which occurred in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Rwanda and Barbados. 33 In short, the U.S. had executed
more juvenile offenders than any other country
As disappointing as the Supreme Court's recently constricted view about
the interpretive value of customary international norms is, the impact of
that view is less sigmficant than that of typical Supreme Court rulings.
In contrast with domestic law, there is no judicial hierarchy in the
interpretive use of customary international law.'3 Accordingly, both lower
federal courts and state courts may make interpretive use of international
norms, independent of the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in this area. In
fact, some state and lower federal courts have made significant contributions
to this emerging area of jurisprudence.' 35 Additionally, legislative and
executive branch officials, at all levels of government, are free to take
account of customary international law norms in their official acts.'3 6
130. Id. at 369.
131. Id. at 369 n.l.
132. Id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rig/ts Law in State
Courts: A View from California, 18 krr'. LAw 61, 67 (1984).
135. See Judicial Protection, supra note 26, at 835-36 nn.140-42 (citing cases).
136. See Jordan J. Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons? A Configurative
Approach to Decision Integrating International and Domestic Law, 18 HARv INT'L L.J.
19 (1977).
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VI. CONCLUSION
I think there is a great promise that the United States Bill of Rights
and the International Bill of Rights can work together to protect the
human rights of Americans. That interrelationship was well-stated by
President Jimmy Carter in the message that he issued upon signing the
two international covenants and sending them to the Senate. He said:
The covenants that I signed today are unusual in the world of international
politics and diplomacy They say absolutely nothing about powerful govern-
ments or military alliances or the privileges and immunities of statesmen and
high officials. Instead, they are concerned about the rights of individual
human beings and the duties of government to the people they are created
to serve
[T]o those who believe that instruments of this kind are futile, I
would suggest that there are powerful lessons to be learned in the history of
my own country Our own Declaration of Independence and the Bill of
Rights expressed a lofty standard of liberty and equality, but in practice
these rights were enjoyed only by a very small segment of our people. In
the years and decades that followed, those who struggled for umversal
suffrage, those who struggled for the abolition of slavery, those who struggled
for women's rights, those who struggled for racial equality, in spite of
discouragement and personal danger, drew their own inspiration from these
two great documents-the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.
Because the beliefs expressed in these documents were at the heart of what
we Americans most valued about ourselves, they created a momentum toward
the realization of the hopes that they offered
My hope and my belief is that the international covenants that I signed
today can play a similar role in the advancement and the ultimate realization
of human rights in the world at large.3 7
As I noted earlier, during the first century of our own Bill of Rights,
it largely languished, unenforced. The rights of Americans were often
honored in the breach. During the second century of our Bill of Rights,
it was actually used by lawyers and activists as a potent tool for making
important strides toward realizing our national ideals of liberty, justice
and equality for all. As we enter the third century of our own Bill c.f
Rights, I hope that the International Bill of Rights will soon complement
it as an important additional tool that will help to bring us ever closer
to those original ideals.
137 Remarks on Signing International Covenants on Human Rights, 13 WEEKLY COM'
PRES. Doc. 1488, 1488-89 (Oct. 5, 1977).
[Vol. 24
